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PAST VIOLENCE, FUTURE DANGER?:
RETHINKING DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEPARTURES
UNDER FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
SECTION 5K2.13
Eva E. Subotnik
Under section 5K2.13 of the FederalSentencing Guidelines, a judge is
permitted to reduce a defendant's sentence on the grounds of diminished capacity. Most courts construing this provision have ruled that defendants
whose offenses involved violence or the threat of violence are ineligiblefor a
reduction in sentence. This Note argues that such an interpretation, which
makes past violence a proxy for predictingfuture dangerousness, is problematic. Medically or psychologically treated, defendants may no longer pose a
dangerto society. This Note urges that, in accordancewith section 5K2.13's
language and history, courts should focus more broadly on whether the facts
underlying a defendant's offense, including his or her prospect for treatment
or rehabilitation, indicate a need to protect the public. In addition, the Sentencing Commission should amend section 5K2.13 explicitly to direct the
courts to address issues of public protection beyond a defendant's acts of
violence.
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines) impose a rigid
method for sentencing federal defendants: The sentence must fall within
the narrow range determined by the point on a grid where a defendant's
Offense Level meets his or her Criminal History Category.' There are,
however, factors that enable sentencing judges, exercising their discretion, to reduce or augment a sentence after a starting point has been
determined through the grid. One of these factors is diminished mental
capacity, which section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines establishes as a basis for
downward departure:
A sentence below the applicable guideline range may be warranted if the defendant committed the offense while suffering
from a significantly reduced mental capacity. However, the
court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if (1)
the significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants; (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a
serious threat of violence; or (3) the defendant's criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the defendant to protect the
public. If a departure is warranted, the extent of the departure
1. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. A (2001)
sentencing table).
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should reflect the extent to which the reduced2 mental capacity
contributed to the commission of the offense.
The current text of section 5K2.13 is the product of an amendment
to the Guidelines in 1998 by the United States Sentencing Commission
(the Commission).3 Prior to this amendment, a circuit split had developed over the interpretation of the term "non-violent offense," which was
the only type of offense eligible for a downward departure under the
then-existing section 5K2.13. 4 The5 Commission sought to resolve the
split through its 1998 amendment.
The new provision has solved few problems; indeed, it has caused
others. 6 First, the Commission provided no guidance for interpreting the
ambiguous language of the second clause, "the facts and circumstances of
the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the public because the
offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence."'7 This
2. Id. § 5K2.13.
3. Id. app. C, amend. 583.
4. The text of the old version of section 5K2.13 stated:
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from
significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or
other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to
which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense,
provided that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for
incarceration to protect the public.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (1995) (amended 1998).
5. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 583 (2001) ("This amendment
addresses a circuit conflict regarding whether the diminished capacity departure is
precluded if the defendant committed a 'crime of violence' .... The amendment replaces
the current policy statement with a new provision that essentially represents a compromise
approach to the circuit conflict."). The 1998 amendment also extended section 5K2.13 to
both cognitive and volitional mental impairments. Id.
6. By papering over the circuit conflict, the Commission, while itself failing to endorse
a clear position, likely deflected Supreme Court review and articulation of how a crime's
violent nature should factor into sentencing the mentally ill. This result would not be
surprising given the Supreme Court's rules on certiorari:
A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The
following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter
Sup. Ct. R. 10; see also Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991) (stating that
Congress envisioned that the Commission "would make whatever clarifying revisions to the
Guidelines conflicting judicial decisions might suggest" and that "[tihis congressional
expectation alone might induce us to be more restrained and circumspect in using our
certiorari power as the primary means of resolving such conflicts").
7. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(2) (2001). In practice, departures
under section 5K2.13 have been granted for white collar crimes. E.g., United States v.
Sadolsky, 234 F.3d 938, 940 (6th Cir. 2000) (sentencing for computer fraud); United States
v. Roach, No. 00 CR 411, 2001 WL 664438, at *5 (N.D. Il. June 4, 2001) (sentencing for
wire fraud). They have been denied in street crime cases. E.g., United States v. Thames,
214 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) (sentencing for armed bank robbery). Certain crimes
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clause will be referred to herein as the "current offense prong."8 As a
result of the current offense prong's ambiguity, most courts have seized
exclusively on the presence or threat of violence in an offense to preclude downward departure under section 5K2.13(2), despite indications
that the Commission wanted sentencing courts to take into account the
future risk posed to the public by a mentally ill defendant. The courts'
interpretation is problematic since neither the Commission nor the
courts have justified the notion that the presence or threat of violence in
an offense necessarily indicates that the offender will be a risk to the public in the future.9 The assumption underlying the distinction between
mentally ill offenders who commit violent crimes and those who commit
nonviolent crimes is that the former should be incapacitated for longer
periods because they may be more dangerous.10 That explanation was
partly the basis for a circuit court's dismissal of a constitutional challenge
to the different treatment of violent and nonviolent offenses under the
old section 5K2.13.11
This Note contends that there is no necessary connection between
the danger a mentally ill defendant will pose to the public and the violent
nature of her offense because, most significantly, medical treatment and
rehabilitation may render her harmless to society. Consequently, courts
should interpret the malleable language of section 5K2.13 to grant authority for downward departures even in cases of violence. 12 This judicial
test these bounds. For example, there has been much debate over the appropriate
classification of unarmed bank robbery. Compare United States v. Houser, No. 00-30235,
2001 WL 985713, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 24, 2001) (unpublished opinion) (declaring
defendant ineligible for departure), with United States v. McFadzean, No. 98 CR 754, 1999
WL 1144909, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1999) (stating that a court may depart in such a case).
8. Although one commentator labeled at least part of this language the "violence
prong of section 5K2.13," Robert R. Miller, Comment, Diminished Capacity-Expanded
Discretion: Section 5K2.13 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Demise of the
"Non-Violent Offense," 46 Vill. L. Rev. 679, 707 (2001), this Note argues that
considerations broader than those of violence should guide the interpretation of this
clause, and therefore declines to use that label.
9. Interestingly, many other bases for downward departure do not include an element
of violence, let alone make it a preclusive factor. See, e.g., U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 5K1.1 (2001) (substantial assistance to authorities); id. § 5K2.11 (lesser harms);
id. § 5K2.12 (coercion and duress); id. § 5K2.16 (voluntary disclosure of offense); cf. id.
§ 5K2.10 (victim's conduct) (stating that victim's misconduct "usually would not be
relevant in the context of non-violent offenses") (emphasis added). But see id. § 5K2.20
(aberrant behavior) (stating that downward departure is not available if, among other
reasons, "the offense involved serious bodily injury or death" or "the defendant discharged
a firearm or otherwise used a firearm or a dangerous weapon").
10. See, e.g., United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook,J.,
dissenting) ("When the disturbed person's conduct is non-violent ....
incapacitation is less
important.").
11. United States v. Sullivan, 75 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1996). After agreeing with the
argument that violent mentally ill offenders may be more dangerous, the court in Sullivan
noted that "[i]n any event, this panel is bound by the en banc decision in Poff" Id.
12. Indeed, one court has already done so. See United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d
328 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), discussed infra Part II.D.1.

2002]

RETHINKING DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEPARTURES

1343

solution would ensure that the balancing of factors shifts toward considerations of public safety and lenity to individual defendants, and away from
considerations solely of violence. In addition, this Note argues that the
Commission should amend section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines by striking
from the current offense prong the words "because the offense involved
actual violence or a serious threat of violence." Excising these words
would alleviate the need to pinpoint the definitions of "actual violence"
and "serious threat of violence." Most importantly, removing these words
would make it unmistakably clear that the focus of courts under section
5K2.13 should be on whether the facts and circumstances of a defendant's offense, construed broadly to incorporate the prospect of the defendant's treatment or rehabilitation, indicate a need to protect the
public.
This Note recognizes that it is in the very nature of sentencing guidelines to narrow disparities in sentencing by limiting the discretion of
judges. This Note nevertheless takes the position that judges should be
trusted to make determinations of dangerousness, and that such liberalization is consistent with the language and purpose of the Guidelines.
Part I briefly describes the background of section 5K2.13 and the
rationale for this section's inquiry into the violence of an offense. Part II
examines the problems arising under the current section 5K2.13. This
Part also considers the problems inherent in relying on the violent character of an offense as a test for dangerousness. Part III proposes that
section 5K2.13 better coordinate the goal of lenity toward the mentally ill
with the correlative need to protect the public. It argues that this shift in
emphasis, which should be effected through amendment by the Commission, and in the interim by the courts, is fully consistent with the role
envisioned for the courts under the Guidelines. It further argues that
this approach is especially important given the way in which the federal
criminal justice system administers the sentences of the mentally ill at the
present time.
I. BACKGROUND TO DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEPARTURES AND THE
CURRENT OFFENSE PRONG

A. General Background and Mechanics of the Guidelines
The Commission was created by the Sentencing Reform Act (the
Act) as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.13
Through the Act, Congress directed the Commission to "promulgate and
distribute to all courts of the United States ...guidelines ...for use of a
sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a [fed13. Congress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 as Chapter II of the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987-2040 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C. (1994)).
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eral] criminal case."'14 The Commission was charged with, among other
things, reducing disparity in sentencing while allowing for consideration
of individual circumstances.' 5 Pursuant to the Act, the Commission issued the first set of Guidelines in 1987.16 The Guidelines, including pol18
7
icy statements like section 5K2.13,1 are binding on the federal courts.
The Guidelines require a district court, when imposing a sentence,
to "identif[y] the base offense level assigned to the crime in question,
adjust[ ] the level as the Guidelines instruct, and determine[ ] the defendant's criminal history category." 19 The sentencing range that is arrived
at is listed in months. "lIT] he maximum of the range established for such
a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the
greater of 25 percent or 6 months .... 20
The district courts do, however, retain some discretion to take individual circumstances into account. 2 ' Congress permits a district court to
depart from the applicable Guideline range in a particular case if "the
court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of
a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission. ' 22 The Guidelines reflect this mandate. Gener14. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A(]) (stating
that purpose of Commission is to "promulgat[e] detailed guidelines prescribing the
appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal crimes"); see also Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989) (suggesting that Congress delegated to the
Commission "the power to promulgate sentencing guidelines for every federal criminal
offense").
15. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (stating that the Commission was charged with
"provid[ing] certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors").
16. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A(2).
17. Id. § 5K2.13 (categorizing provision, in its title, as policy statement).
18. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993) ("The principle that the
Guidelines Manual is binding on federal courts applies as well to policy statements."); see
also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391 ("[T]he Guidelines bind judges and courts in the exercise of
their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases.").
19. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 88 (1996) (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 1BI.1).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (2).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994) (see infra text accompanying note 22); 28 U.S.C.
§ 991 (b) (1) (B) (see supra note 15); Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 ("The Act did not eliminate all of
the district court's discretion, however. [Congress acknowledged] the wisdom, even the
necessity, of sentencing procedures that take into account individual circumstances .... ).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Some have argued that the much higher percentage of
downward compared to upward departures reveals the harshness of the sentences imposed
under the Guidelines. See Federal Public Defenders, Submission to United States
Sentencing Commission, March 10, 2000, 12 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 140, 140-41 (1999)
(submitted by Jon Sand on behalf of the Federal Public and Community Defenders)
("Federal judges are sentencing at the bottom of the guideline range and below the
guideline range far more often than they sentence at the top of the guideline range or
above.... This means ...that the federal judges who impose sentence find the guideline
ranges to be too high.").
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ally, the courts are "to treat each guideline as carving out a 'heartland,' a
set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guideline describes." 23 Where the factors of a case make it atypical, however, those
24
factors may provide potential bases for departure.
Interpreting the Guidelines, the Supreme Court has identified four
categories of departure factors: "unmentioned," "forbidden," "discouraged," and "encouraged." 25 According to the Court, the sentencing
judge may depart on account of factors that are unmentioned by the
Guidelines if, relying on the theory and structure of both the Guidelines
as a whole and the applicable individual guidelines, the court deems
them sufficient to take a case out of the heartland. 26 In contrast to unmentioned factors, forbidden, discouraged, and encouraged factors are
specifically identified by the Guidelines. Certain factors, including race,
sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socioeconomic status, 27 are forbidden from being used as grounds for departure by the sentencing
court. 28 The Commission also produced a list of discouraged factors, 29
which are "not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range,"30 such as a defendant's family ties and responsibilities or education and vocational
skills.31 Finally, the Commission suggested encouraged factors, 3 2 which
may serve as grounds for departure in sentencing.3 3 Diminished capacity
34
under section 5K2.13 is an encouraged factor.

23. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A(4) (b) (2001).
24. Id.
25. Koon, 518 U.S. at 94-96.
26. Id. at 96 (using term "unmentioned"); see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 5K2.0 ("Any case may involve factors in addition to those identified that have not been
given adequate consideration by the Commission. Presence of any such factor may warrant
departure from the guidelines, under some circumstances, in the discretion of the
sentencing court."). Under this rule, one district court held that a defendant's
susceptibility to treatment did not warrant a downward departure since that factor did not
sufficiently differentiate his case from the heartland of other sex offender cases. United
States v.Lake, 53 F. Supp. 2d 771, 786 (D.N.J. 1999).
27. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.10.
28. Id. ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b); Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96 (using term "forbidden").
29. Koon, 518 U.S. at 95 (using term "discouraged").
30. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt.
31. Id. §§ 5H1.6, 5H1.2.
32. Koon, 518 U.S. at 94 (using term "encouraged").
33. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0 (stating that "this subpart seeks to
aid the court by identifying some of the factors" that "may warrant departure from the
guideline range").
34. See id. (implicitly including section 5K2.13 among factors referred to in section
5K2.0); see also United States v. Neal, 249 F.3d 1251, 1256 n.5 (10th Cir. 2001)
(characterizing diminished capacity as an encouraged factor); United States v. Leandre,
132 F.3d 796, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (same). For examples of other encouraged factors, see
supra note 9.
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B. The Guidelines' OriginalApproach to Diminished Capacity and Violence
In the Act, Congress directed the Commission to consider the relevance of certain offender characteristics, including a defendant's "mental
and emotional condition to the extent that such condition mitigates the
defendant's culpability. ' 35 The Commission subsequently determined
that, in general, "[m]ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range."'3 6 From the start, however, the Commission conceived of the possibility that mitigation in sentence due to "a serious
mental disability" might be warranted in limited circumstances. 37 In its
initial statements about diminished capacity, the Commission indicated
that mitigation should be available only to defendants who committed
nonviolent offenses. 38 It explained that:
A reduction in sentence may be justified when a defendant suffers from a significantly reduced mental capacity so that he did
35. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (4) (1994). See generally StephenJ. Schulhofer, Assessing the
Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity, 29 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. 833, 858-59 (1992) (describing statutory background of consideration of individual
offender characteristics).
36. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.3. See generally Michael L. Perlin &
Keri K Gould, Rashomon and the Criminal Law: Mental Disability and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 22 Am. J. Crim. L. 431, 440 n.46 (1995) ("The Commission
published no evidence to document or substantiate the 'not ordinarily relevant' language
added to the policy statement."). The authors explain that:
[T] he legislative history of the Commission's policy statement on the influence of
mental disability is spotty at best. The brevity of the policy statement seems to be
due to Congress's failure to provide any coherent explanation of the weight due
individual offender characteristics and a failure of the Commission to conduct or
refer to any empirical studies or evidence regarding the effect of mental disability
on sentencing patterns. Although this omission was initially recognized by the
Commission, it was later deleted without any additional explanation.
Id. at 433 n.5 (citing Marc Miller & Daniel J. Freed, Offender Characteristics & Victim
Vulnerability: The Differences Between Policy Statements and Guidelines, 3 Fed.
Sentencing Rep. 3, 4 (1990)).
37. Preliminary Draft of Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 51 Fed. Reg.
35,080, 35,131-33 (proposed Oct. 1, 1986) ("Examples of such mitigating factors might be
the presence of a serious mental disability that did not rise to the level of a successful
defense ....").Interestingly, the Commission's contemplation of a basis for mitigation in
sentence on account of mental illness was somewhat in tension with the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1994), which has provided the standard for federal
courts' application of a federal insanity defense since John Hinckley's acquittal for the
attempted assassination of President Reagan. The Insanity Defense Reform Act suggests
that mental illness other than "severe mental disease or defect" is insufficient to prevent
the attribution of guilt. Id. § 17(a). Section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines, in contrast,
implicitly acknowledges the reduced culpability of less acutely mentally impaired
defendants by making available a downward departure in sentence for defendants deemed
culpable and sane enough to be convicted. See infra Part I.C (discussing issue of
culpability with respect to sentencing of the mentally ill).
38. Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920,
3970 § Y218 (proposed Feb. 6, 1987) (proposing language nearly identical to that which
would be used in original section 5K2.13, displayed supra note 4).
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not fully appreciate the criminality of his conduct. This provision applies only when a defendant does not present a danger to
the public. Thus, it may not be applied when the offense is a
violent one, or a defendant's criminal history otherwise indicate[s] that he would present a danger to the public if
released. 9
By its use of the word "Thus," the Commission suggested that every violent offender poses a risk to the public sufficient to deny that offender a
reduced sentence on account of diminished capacity. This violent/nonviolent distinction was codified in the original section 5K2.13, which stated
that a downward departure could be available for a "non-violent
40
offense."
The Guidelines, however, did not provide standards for interpreting
"non-violent offense" in the original section 5K2.13. 4 1 As a result, a circuit split developed over the issue of whether the term "non-violent offense" should be defined as the converse of the term "crime of violence"
set forth in section 4B1.2 of the Guidelines (part of the career offender
provision).42 A majority of the circuits, including the Sixth, Seventh,
39. Id. at 3971. But cf. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1
(making downward departure available to those suffering from either cognitive or
volitional ailments).
40. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (1995) (amended 1998); see supra
note 4 (displaying full text). Virtually every court construed "non-violent offense" to be a
threshold requirement for a downward departure under the old section 5K2.13. But see
United States v. Acosta, 846 F. Supp. 278, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[Section 5K2.13] does not
purport to exclude the possibility that there may be circumstances in which mental
retardation of the defendant may be considered by the court, even in a case of a violent
offense, in determining whether a departure downward is appropriate.").
41. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (1995) (amended 1998); see
also John A. Henderson, Note, A Square Meaning for a Round Phrase: Applying the
Career Offender Provision's "Crime of Violence" to the Diminished Capacity Provision of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 1475, 1503 (1995) ("The
Congressional deliberations on the Guidelines do not provide a specific definition of 'nonviolent offense."'). This failure to provide a definition of violence can be contrasted with
detailed articulations in other federal contexts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (3) (2000)
(defining "crime of violence" for penalty for using or carrying a firearm "during and in
relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime" under § 924(c)); U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 (2001) (defining term "crime of violence" as used
in career offender provision section 4B1.1). For further discussion of the term "crime of
violence" in the career offender provision, see infra note 42.
42. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 583 (2001). Importing
section 4B1.2's "crime of violence" to define the scope of the original section 5K2.13's
"non-violent offense" requirement meant that a downward departure for diminished
capacity was not available if the offense was punishable by a term of imprisonment of more
than one year and
(1) ha[d] as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person of another, or
(2) [was] burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involve[d] use of explosives,
or otherwise involve[d] conduct that present[ed] a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.
Id. § 4B1.2. The commentary to section 4B1.2 also provides that:
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Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, 43 and also, until just prior to the
1998 amendment, the Third Circuit,4 4 held that the section 4B1.2 definition controlled. A consequence of this position was that a defendant
could be automatically disqualified from downward departure for dimin-

ished capacity solely on the basis of the elements of her offense, even if
''45
her crime had only an "unrealized prospect of violence.
On the other hand, a minority view-adopted by the Fourth and
District of Columbia Circuits, and argued forcefully by Judge Easterbrook
in a dissenting opinion-held that a section 5K2.13 downward departure
could be available if a court made its own evaluation that, based on the

facts and circumstances, the offense was not violent. 46 According to this
view, "[T]he term 'non-violent offense' in [old] section 5K2.13 refers to
those offenses that, in the act, reveal that a defendant is not danger-

ous."4 7 Thus, for the courts in the minority, an offense might meet the
criteria of a "crime of violence" under section 4B1.2 but still be deemed a

"non-violent offense" under the old section 5K2.13.48 The minority circuit courts drew on what they perceived as the divergent policies underly-

ing, respectively, the sentencing of repeat criminal offenders and the sentencing of offenders with diminished capacity. "In short, section 4B1.2

can be read as depriving career offenders of the benefit of the doubt, and
"Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of
credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included as "crimes of
violence" if (A) that offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the
conduct set forth (i.e. expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was
convicted involved use of explosives (including any explosive material or
destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.
Id. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1.
43. United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Mayotte, 76 F.3d 887, 889 (8th Cir.
1996); United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dailey, 24
F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 1994).
44. United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 791 (3d Cir. 1990), overruled by United
States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 1998) (en ban6); see infra note 46 (discussing shift in
Third Circuit's position).
45. Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); see supra note 42 (providing
section 4B1.2's crime of violence language).
46. United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) ("A 'non-violent offense' in ordinary legal (and lay) understanding is one in
which mayhem did not occur."). The Third Circuit, which ultimately also rejected the
majority view, developed a different standard. See Askari, 140 F.3d at 549 ("' [N]on-violent
offenses' under USSC § 5K2.13 are those which do not involve a reasonable perception
that force against persons may be used in committing the offense."), vacated by 159 F.3d
774 (3d Cir. 1998).
47. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452.
48. Id. at 1453.

2002]

RETHINKING DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEPARTURES

1349

assuming the worst." 49 In contrast, a definition of "non-violent offense"
should be read so as "to treat with lenity those individuals 50whose 'reduced
mental capacity' contributed to commission of a crime.
C. JudicialArguments for Limiting Section 5K2.13 Eligibility to Nonviolent
Offenders
The courts have found that special considerations apply in sentencing the mentally ill. 5 1 Several courts referred to the Act in elaborating on
52
the limited explanation provided by the Commission for restricting section 5K2.13 departures to those mentally ill offenders who commit nonviolent crimes. 5 3 The Act lists a few basic principles the courts are to consider in imposing a sentence. These include: just punishment, adequate
deterrence, and protection of the public. 54 Regarding the first, just punishment,5 5 the courts have found that, although their mental impairments do not rise to the level of insanity, people suffering from mental
56
As
illness are deserving of less punishment than ordinary defendants.
judge Easterbrook wrote, "Persons who find it difficult to control their
49. Id. at 1451.
50. Id. at 1452.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Atkins, 116 F.3d 1566, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Here [the
defendant's] history is the history of a mentally ill criminal and therefore his sentence
must reflect the extent to which that additional characteristic, together with those
normally taken into consideration, may increase or decrease the likelihood that he will be
a danger to society.").
52. See supra text accompanying note 39.
53. This elaboration, formulated in Judge Easterbrook's dissent from United States v.
Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting), was cited with
approval by both minority courts and at least one majority court. See United States v.
Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 539-40 (4th Cir. 1994) (minority court approving); United States v.
Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (majority court approving); Chatman, 986 F.2d at
1452 (D.C. Cir.) (minority court approving).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994). Another factor listed, "the seriousness of the
offense," id. § 3553(a) (2) (A), would presumably be accounted for when the sentencing
court initially arrived at the defendant's Offense Level.
55. This Note interprets the consideration ofjust punishment to be the equivalent of
a blameworthiness or desert theory of punishment.
56. See Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting) ("The criminal justice system
long has meted out lower sentences to persons who, although not technically insane,...
[lack] full command of their actions. The Sentencing Commission based its guidelines on
the common practices of judges, which it attempted to make more uniform without
fundamentally altering the criteria influencing sentences."). For a discussion of reduced
mental capacity as it relates to the distinct phases of conviction and sentencing, see United
States v. Ventrilla, 233 F.3d 166, 169 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that, for an insanity defense, a
"defendant must persuade a jury by clear and convincing evidence" that she could not
appreciate wrongfulness of her acts, whereas to demonstrate diminished capacity for
purpose of sentencing, a defendant must only "persuade a judge by a preponderance of
the evidence" that she suffers from impaired mental capacity and that that deficiency is
causally linked to her commission of the crime); United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 796,
802 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (stating that diminished capacity normally "refers to situations where
a defendant's mental abnormality . . . negates the element of mens rea required for
conviction for the charged offense," while "[c]onsideration of a defendant's mental
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conduct do not-considerations of dangerousness to one side-deserve
'57
Simias much punishment as those who act maliciously or for gain.
larly, deterring the future criminal behavior of the defendant or other
mentally ill individuals may be a less justifiable basis for punishment since
"legal sanctions are less effective with persons suffering from mental abnormalities. 5 8s One court has argued, furthermore, that a reduction in
sentence for the mentally disabled does not undermine the deterrence of
"fully competent offenders" since the latter should "know that they would
'5 9
face the much harsher penalties required for them by the Guidelines.
On the other hand, with respect to protection of the public, "A hefty
sentence [for a mentally ill offender] may be appropriate simply because
it incapacitatesand so reduces the likelihood of further offenses." 60 This
line of reasoning argues that a basis for distinguishing between violent
and nonviolent offenders is their differing need for incapacitation:
"When the disturbed person's conduct is non-violent.., incapacitation is
less important."6 1 Courts and commentators have argued, therefore, that
the purpose of section 5K2.13 is to allow for sentence reductions only in
those cases where, along with diminished just punishment and deterrence justifications for lengthy imprisonment, there is also a reduced
need for incapacitation because the offense was not violent. 62 If "violent"
condition in sentencing, on the other hand, is appropriately viewed as an extension of the
concept of 'diminished (or partial) responsibility"' (citations omitted)).
57. Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
58. Id.
59. United States v. Speight, 726 F. Supp. 861, 869 (D.D.C. 1989).
60. Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
61. Id. Incapacitation was a partial justification for the Seventh Circuit's rejection of a
due process and equal protection challenge to the distinction between violent and
nonviolent offenses under the old section 5K2.13. United States v. Sullivan, 75 F.3d 297,
300 (7th Cir. 1996). The defendant argued that it was unconstitutional to refuse to
consider mitigation in sentence for violent offenders under section 5K2.13 when such
mitigation was available both to nonviolent offenders under section 5K2.13 and to capital
defendants as a basis for converting a death sentence to life imprisonment. Id. The
Seventh Circuit found a rational basis for distinguishing violent offenders under section
5K2.13 in that a downward departure would "result in an individual's earlier release into
society," and "physical danger to the public may be involved." Id.
62. See United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Incapacitation
alone retains its full force against such [mentally impaired] offenders. . . . When
defendants with reduced mental capacity do not exhibit violent conduct, however,
incapacitation is not such an important goal [and downward departure may be
available]."); United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Section
5K2.13 must be interpreted in light of the fact that, with the decreased relevance of
deterrence and desert, incapacitation becomes the primary rationale for incarcerating
those whose crimes were committed as a result of 'significantly reduced mental
capacity."'); Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting) ("Section 5K2.13 read as a
whole ... says that when incapacitation is not an important justification for punishment,
mental condition may be the basis of a departure."); see also Andrew Brown, Limits on the
Use of Diminished Capacity as a Basis for Departure, 7 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 193, 193
(1995) ("[W]hy preclude departures.., when the offense was violent both as defined and
as executed? . . . The Commission apparently determined that anyone who commits a
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is construed to mean reflective of dangerousness, 63 then this interpretation makes sense: The public should be protected from dangerous offenders. If, however, as is often the case, "violent" is construed to mean
something approximating heinous, 64 then this interpretation may lead to
both overinclusive and underinclusive outcomes. These issues are discussed in Parts II.C and II.D.
II.

THE PROBLEMS WITH THE VIOLENCE STANDARD

The circuit split over which offenses should preclude downward departure under the old section 5K2.13 raised the fundamental question of
the role of violence in sentencing the mentally impaired. This Part will
explore whether the 1998 revision succeeded in resolving that question
and will also look at the problems inherent in any approach that focuses
on past violence when determining whether a downward departure for
diminished capacity should be granted. Given that the presence or threat
of violence has been construed to foreclose downward departure under
the revised section 5K2.13 in virtually every case, it is significant that the
Commission provided no discussion of the role of violence in the new
provision.
A. The Amended Section 5K2.13: An Unclear Role for Violence
Although the amendment purported to "address[ ] a circuit conflict,"65 it is not entirely clear how the conflict was to be settled. 66 It is
true that the amendment resolves the disagreement about whether
threats of violence, as well as actual violence, should be considered
preclusive by a sentencing court. 6 7 The Commission failed, however, to
violent offense necessarily poses a risk to the public."); Miller, supra note 8, at 709
("[T]ension has developed between the need to protect society from dangerous criminal
offenders and the need to show leniency towards those offenders who suffer from
diminished mental capacity and commit crimes devoid of either actual violence or a
serious threat of violence.").
63. See, e.g., Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452 (interpreting "non-violent offense" under old
version of section 5K2.13 to "refer[ ] to those offenses that, in the act, reveal that a
defendant is not dangerous"); see also United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir.
1994) (quoting Chatman).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 614-15 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding
that "the record would not permit such a conclusion" of nonviolence "[u]nder any
definition" where defendant "committed armed takeovers" of a bank's "employees and
customers in which everyone was ordered, at gunpoint, to lay [sic] on the floor while
[defendant] collected money"); infra Part IL.B (discussing United States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d
336 (4th Cir. 2001)).
65. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 583 (2001).
66. See Miller, supra note 8, at 707 ("By failing to expressly adopt one view over the
other, the Commission potentially fumbled its best chance to clarify the violence prong of
section 5K2.13.").
67. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(2) (addressing both "actual
violence" and "a serious threat of violence"). Compare Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting) ("A 'non-violent offense' in ordinary legal (and lay) understanding is one in
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define "violence" or "serious threat" for the purposes of "actual violence
or a serious threat of violence. '68 Among the options the Commission
rejected in amending section 5K2.13 were: adopting the converse of the
section 4B1.2 definition of "crime of violence" as the definition of "nonviolent offense"; adopting a dangerousness test for the definition of "nonviolent"; and striking the word "non-violent" entirely from the old version
of section 5K2.13.69 Thus, not only did the Commission reject two options that would have provided a definition of violence; it also failed to
provide a definition for the option it ultimately selected.
Beyond omitting a definition of violence, the language of the
amended version of section 5K2.13 does not clearly describe what role
violence, however defined, should play in downward departures. Like
section 5K2.13's criminal history prong, 70 the current offense prong
seeks to protect society from dangerous defendants. In amending the
provision in 1998, the Commission could have revised section 5K2.13 to
say that "the court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if
...the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a need
to protect the public"-without adding "because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence." Indeed, during the course
of the amending process, the Commission considered, but ultimately rejected, a virtually identical suggestion. 71 At the same time, it also rejected
a focus on the violence of a defendant's offense to the exclusion of con72
sideration of the risk that particular defendant posed to the public.
which mayhem did not occur."), with Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1454 (determining that
"[s]ome offenses that never resulted in physical violence may, nonetheless, indicate that a
defendant is exceedingly dangerous, and should be incapacitated," and accordingly, that
"an offense that involved a real and serious threat of violence ... is not, in our view, within
the compass of a 'non-violent offense"'), and United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815,
819 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding defendant ineligible for downward departure because of his
"threatened use of physical force against the person ... of another" (citing career offender
provision, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 (1989))).
68. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (2001). Neither is the term
"violence" listed among the terms of "general applicability." Id. § 1BI.1, cmt. n.1. It could
be argued that this failure to provide guidance for the interpretation of violence conflicts
with Congress's charge to the Commission to "avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing
disparities." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (B) (1994); see supra note 15 (displaying expanded
text).
69. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements,
and Commentary, 63 Fed. Reg. 602, 632 (proposed Jan. 6, 1998).
70. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(3) (2001); see supra text
accompanying note 2 (displaying full text).
71. See Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy
Statements, and Commentary, 63 Fed. Reg. at 632 ("Option Four defines the scope of the
departure broadly by removing the 'nonviolent offense' limitation."). The Commission
ultimately chose "Option Three," which uses the current offense prong language, id.
72. See id. ("Option One (the majority view) defines the scope of the departure
narrowly to exclude all offenses that would be crimes of violence under the career offender
guideline.").
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One interpretive problem is that the new section 5K2.13 is no longer
introduced by the words, "If the defendant committed a non-violent offense." 73 Rather, the new violence inquiry instructs courts to consider
whether the "facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate
a need to protect the public," followed by "because the offense involved
74
The word "because" in
actual violence or a serious threat of violence."
this context is ambiguous. May a court make a downward departure
upon a determination that the facts and circumstances of a defendant's
offense do not indicate a need to protect the public, even though there
were violent aspects to the crime? Conversely, does this wording mean
that if an offense is not violent, a court need not consider whether the
facts of a defendant's case render him a threat to public safety such that
he is precluded from a section 5K2.13 downward departure?
These issues are not addressed by the Commission. 7 5 Even the Commission's own description of what it did is unclear. Initially, in describing
the options it was considering for what would become the new provision,
the Commission explicitly characterized the option it eventually adopted
as "a variation of the minority view." 76 Yet, in its commentary to the 1998
amendment, the Commission describes the new provision as a "compro'77
mise approach.
In light of the amendment's history, the language used, and the
Commission's characterizations of what it had done, it would seem that
the current offense prong precludes departure only upon a finding of
both future danger and past violence. 78 Significantly, this interpretation
saves the phrase "the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense
indicate a need to protect the public" from being superfluous by indicating that both this condition and that of the presence or threat of violence
73. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (1995) (amended 1998); see supra
note 4 (displaying full text).
74. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(2) (2001); see supra text
accompanying note 2 (displaying full text). For a discussion about the phrase "serious
threat of violence," see infra Part II.D.2.
75. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 583 (2001).
76. Notice of Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, Policy Statements,
and Commentary, 63 Fed. Reg. at 632 (describing "Option Three"); see also U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, The Year In Review: 1997-1998, 5 (1998) ("The amendment
effectively overrides the interpretation that a departure categorically is not available for any
defendant convicted of a 'crime of violence,' as that term is defined by the career offender
guideline."), at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/97YRREV.PDF (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
77. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 583 ("The amendment
replaces the current policy statement with a new provision that essentially represents a
compromise approach to the circuit conflict.").
78. For a similar conclusion that the new section 5K2.13 envisions substantial inquiry
into a defendant's dangerousness to the public, see Alan Ellis, Answering the "Why"
Question: The Powerful Departure Grounds of Diminished Capacity, Aberrant Behavior,
and Post-Offense Rehabilitation, 11 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 322, 322 (1999) ("Rather than
focus on whether the offense qualifies as 'violent,' the new version of § 5K2.13 appears to
make the 'need to protect the public' the key consideration in the departure inquiry.").
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must each separately be satisfied in order to preclude a defendant from
downward departure under the current offense prong. Thus, only this
interpretation incorporates both the text of the new provision and the
majority and minority views with respect to the old one. This is not, however, the way most courts have understood amended section 5K2.13.
B. Application of the Amended Section 5K2.13
Courts have interpreted the amended language variously. 79 One circuit court has suggested that it has abandoned the majority view on account of the amendment. 80 On the other hand, at least one circuit court
appears to have continued to invoke the majority circuits' "crime of violence" standard from section 4B1.2 in interpreting the current offense
prong of the amended section 5K2.13.81 Yet another circuit court remanded a case it had previously affirmed en banc for consideration in
82
light of the new provision.
After the amendment to section 5K2.13 went into effect on November 1, 1998, approximately 557 of the 115,403 defendants sentenced in
79. There is disagreement over whether the amendment to section 5K2.13 works a
clarifying or substantive change. Compare United States v. Askari, 159 F.3d 774, 779 (3d
Cir. 1998) (en banc) (referring to "Sentencing Commission's clarifying amendment to
§ 5K2.13" (quoting United States v. Askari, 151 F.3d 131,132 (3d Cir. 1998))), with United
States v. Timbana, 222 F.3d 688, 708 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that amendment to
section 5K2.13 "substantially altered the guideline rather than merely clarifying it"), and
United States v. Allen, No. 98-1480, 1999 WL 282674, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 30, 1999)
(unpublished table decision) ("[T]he Sentencing Commission indicated that it was
making a substantive change . . . ."). This distinction in characterizations could be
significant in some cases since a court may only consider an amendment's effect on a
defendant sentenced under an earlier edition of the Guidelines to the extent that it is a
clarifying amendment. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § IBI.ll (b) (2).
80. Allen, 1999 WL 282674, at *2 (reiterating that in the past it had applied majority
courts' categorical approach to violence, and concluding that "the Sentencing Commission
has indicated that the policy for future cases will be to look to the particular facts and
circumstances present in an individual defendant's offense when determining whether a
§ 5K2.13 departure is possible"); see also Miller, supra note 8, at 708 ("[T]he Sixth Circuit
acknowledged that the categorical approach that it had adopted previously was rejected by
the Commission."); Carlos M. Pelayo, Comment, "Give Me a Break! I Couldn't Help
Myselfl"?: Rejecting Volitional Impairment as a Basis for Departure Under Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Section 5K2.13, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 729, 763-64 (1999) (noting that
"under the newly revised section 5K2.13, whether the offense disqualifies a defendant from
the possibility of departure is ... a fact-specific inquiry").
81. See United States v. Houser, No. 00-30235, 2001 WL 985713, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug.
24, 2001) (unpublished opinion) ("Where an offense is a 'crime of violence,' this court has
concluded that a diminished capacity departure under Section 5K2.13 is unavailable.");
United States v. Tayloe, No. 99-30083, 2000 WL 234832, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 24, 2000)
(unpublished table decision) (affirming lower court's conclusion that section 5K2.13 is
"inapplicable" because defendant "was convicted of a crime of violence"). But see Miller,
supra note 8, at 709-10 (arguing that the Commission's amendment "implicitly reject[ed]
the proposition that the crime of violence definition of section 4B1.2 applies to section
5K2.13").
82. Askari, 159 F.3d at 780.
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fiscal 1999 and 2000 were granted sentence reductions at least partially
on the grounds of diminished capacity.8 3 In most cases, district courts
have subordinated the concern about whether the defendant is a danger
to the public to a concern about whether the defendant's conduct was
violent or threatened violence.8 4 Thus, despite the explicit inclusion of
an inquiry into whether "the facts and circumstances of the defendant's
offense indicate a need to protect the public," in virtually every case the
courts have failed to make downward departure available under section
5K2.13 when they discern "actual violence or a serious threat of violence,"
however they define that phrase. 8 5 The circuit courts, without consider83. The Commission's data on trends in the use of downward departure for
diminished capacity are ambiguous. Recorded downward departures for diminished
capacity were granted as follows: in fiscal 1996, in 148 out of 42,436 total cases, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, 1996 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl.25 (1996),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1996/tab-2425.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); in fiscal 1998, in 192 out of 50,754 total cases, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 1998
Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl.25 (1998), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/ANNRPT/1998/tab2425.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); in fiscal 1999, in
265 out of 55,557 total cases, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 1999 Sourcebook of Federal
Sentencing Statistics tbl.25 (1999), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1999/table
2425.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); in fiscal 2000, in 292 out of 59,846 total
cases, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 2000 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl.25
(2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/table2425.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). The figures noted in the text are a compilation of the 1999 and
2000 statistics. But see id. app. A (describing in introduction the imperfect nature of
reporting on federal sentencing statistics), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/
2000/AppA_00.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For an overview of the
Commission's available Annual Reports and Statistical Sourcebooks, see http://www.ussc.
gov/research.htm.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 154 F. Supp. 2d 774, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding that "[iun this case § 5K2.13 would bar downward departure since the offense
involved actual violence"); see also infra note 87 and accompanying text (citing four
examples of circuit court cases in which district court had denied downward departure).
But see infra Part II.D.1 (discussing United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y.
2000)).
85. But see discussion of Blake infra Part II.D.1. Over the course of section 5K2.13's
history, both prior to and since the 1998 amendment, some defendants and courts have
invoked both section 5H1.3, discussed supra note 36, and section 5K2.0 (the umbrella
policy statement governing "Grounds for Departure") in an attempt to circumvent the
inferred preclusion of violent offenses under section 5K2.13. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual §§ 5H1.3, 5K2.0 (2001). Some circuits have held that sections 5H1.3
and 5K2.0 cannot independently authorize downward departure on account of mental
problems. See, e.g., United States v. Thames, 214 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he
guidelines have already adequately taken into consideration a defendant's mental capacity
with § 5K2.13, and thus § 5K2.0 is inapplicable to Thames's claim that his diminished
mental capacity . . . entitles him to consideration for a downward departure.");
Premachandra v. United States, 101 F.3d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1996) (arriving at similar
conclusion with respect to defendant's invocation of section 5H1.3); see also Thomas W.
Hutchison et al., Federal Sentencing Law and Practice 1367 (2001) (arguing that section
5H1.3 should not be interpreted so as to render "meaningless" section 5K2.13's "exclusion
of violent offenses"). Contra United States v. Strain, No. 97-30362, 1998 WL 708777, at *2
(9th Cir. Oct. 6, 1998) (unpublished table decision) (holding that under section 5K2.0,

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

1356

[Vol. 102:1340

ing the ambiguities created by the current offense prong's phrasing, have
approved this application. At least six circuit courts have declared that
downward departures under section 5K2.13 are simply unavailable in the
face of violence, without addressing the risk the defendant poses to the
public. 86 Usually, the circuit courts have arrived at this conclusion in the
process of affirming denials of sentence reductions by the district
courts.

87

This widespread emphasis on the violent nature of an offense can be
seen in the circuit court's opinion in United States v. Bowe, an unusual case
in which the district court had reduced the defendant's sentence for conduct that most people, though apparently not the district court, would
regard as violent.8 8 The Fourth Circuit-a circuit that had been among
the minority of courts in the circuit split that had precipitated the 1998
"district court had discretion to depart downward on the basis of extraordinary mental or
emotional condition" for violent offense); United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 370-71 (7th
Cir. 1996) ("Recall that section 5H1.3 has that weasel word 'ordinarily,' implying that in an
extraordinary case a mental or emotional condition might warrant a lighter sentence even
if it did not fit the express exception in 5K2.13."); Schulhofer, supra note 35, at 865
(drawing on sections 5H1.3 and 5K2.0 to conclude that "[m]ental and emotional
conditions are not ordinarily relevant in sentencing violent offenders, but such conditions
could become relevant under unusual circumstances").
86. United States v. Petersen, 276 F.3d 432, 437 (8th Cir. 2002) ("A defendant must
have committed a nonviolent offense to be considered for a downward departure under
USSG § 5K2.13."); United States v. Pizzichiello, 272 F.3d 1232, 1238 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The
Guidelines thus prohibit departure where the offense involved actual violence."); United
States v. Constantine, 263 F.3d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 2001) ("[T]his provision is not
applicable to crimes 'involv[ing] actual violence or a serious threat of violence' . . . ."
(second alteration in original)); United States v. Bowe, 257 F.3d 336, 347 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a "district court lacks the discretion to depart downward pursuant to section
5K2.13" because defendant's "conduct included violent acts and a serious threat of
violence"); Thames, 214 F.3d at 614 (5th Cir.) ("[N]o departure may be given where the
crime was violent in nature."); United States v. Freeman, No. 98-5474, 1999 WL 183454, at
*2 (6th Cir. Mar. 16, 1999) (unpublished table decision) ("Section 5K2.13 ...specifically
states that the sentencing court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if the
facts of the defendant's offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence.").
87. E.g., Pizzichiello, 272 F.3d at 1234 (affirming denial of downward departure);
Constantine, 263 F.3d at 1124 (same); Thames, 214 F.3d at 610 (same); Freeman, 1999 WL
183454, at *3 (same). Though no circuit court since the 1998 amendment has confronted
directly the granting of a sentence reduction under section 5K2.13 for an offense the
district court deemed "violent," district courts have unsuccessfully granted downward
departures for conduct that might be considered violent, but have avoided testing the
language of section 5K2.13 by calling the conduct nonviolent, as in Bowe, or by inexplicably
departing on an unclear basis, such as a nonexistent "temporary insanity" basis, as in
Petersen. See Bowe, 257 F.3d at 341, 347-48 (vacating and remanding district court's
sentencing decision, in which district court had concluded that defendant's conduct
neither was violent nor threatened violence and had granted downward departure);
Petersen, 276 F.3d at 437-38 (reversing, because defendant was convicted of violent crimes,
district court's downward departure based on temporary insanity).
88. See 257 F.3d at 341 (noting district court's conclusions that "the stabbing incident
did not evince actual violence" and that "Bowe's statement that if he had found his wife
with a man he would have killed them" did not constitute a sufficiently serious threat of
violence, and its consequent downward departure); see also supra note 87 and
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amendment-reviewed the sentence of the professional boxer Riddick
Bowe for deplorable crimes against his wife:
The undisputed record reveals that Bowe forced his way
into his estranged wife's house by pushing aside her cousin. He
then compelled Mrs. Bowe to leave with him by gesturing that
he would hit her if she did not comply .... The record shows
that Bowe displayed a buck knife, a flashlight, duct tape, pepper
spray, and handcuffs to his wife during the trip from North Carolina to Virginia. He told Mrs. Bowe that he had come prepared
to kill her if he had found her with another man. Bowe stabbed
his wife through a heavy leather jacket. He also slapped her.8 9
The circuit court held that "Iblecause Bowe's course of conduct included violent acts and a serious threat of violence, Bowe is not eligible
for a departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13." 90 Previously, the Fourth
Circuit had explicitly adopted the approach to section 5K2.13 articulated
in United States v. Chatman, which assesses a crime's violence according to
what that aspect reveals about a defendant's dangerousness. 9 1 The circuit court in Bowe, however, focused exclusively on the atrociousness of
the crimes that generated the defendant's sentence and not, for example,
on the nature of the diminished capacity found by the district court 92 or
on what that mental state might indicate about his danger to the public.
Certainly, the heinousness of Bowe's actions cannot be denied, and perhaps it is not surprising that the crimes at issue in Bowe led the circuit
court to substitute an assessment of heinousness for an assessment of dangerousness. This shortcut of relying on the graphic violence of an offense
as a proxy for the future threat an offender poses to the public is, however, problematic. Specifically, such reasoning may produce both underinclusive and overinclusive results. These consequences are explored in
the next two sections.
C. The Underinclusive Problem of a Violence Standard
Relying on the violence of the crime generating the sentence to predict future danger to the public creates what might be considered a loophole: It leaves eligible for downward departure defendants who may be
quite dangerous to society, but who have no criminal history, and whose
accompanying text (describing usual posture of section 5K2.13 cases in which district court
denies departure on grounds of violence and circuit court affirms).
89. Bowe, 257 F.3d at 347.
90. Id.
91. See United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 539-40 (4th Cir. 1994) (determining
that "the term 'non-violent offense' in section 5K2.13 refers to those offenses that, in the
act, reveal that a defendant is not dangerous" (quoting United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d
1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1993))).
92. 257 F.3d at 341 ("The [district] court . . . found that Bowe suffered from
diminished capacity.").
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present conviction is for a crime that involves no violence. 93 Such a case
might be presented by a mentally impaired defendant convicted, like the
undeniably dangerous Al Capone, for willfully attempting to evade and
defeat income taxes and for failing to file tax returns. 94 The current offense prong is inherently vulnerable to this problem since it directs a
court's consideration of whether the "facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate a need to protect the public" to situations in
which "the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of
violence."
Of course, the overall departure system set up by the Guidelines substantially mitigates this potential for underinclusion: Mentally impaired
defendants are not entitled to sentence reductions, but rather, section
5K2.13 is available solely at the discretion of the court. 9 5 Thus, when a
departure seems unwarranted, a court can simply deny a sentence reduction for a particular defendant under section 5K2.13 as it now stands.
Nevertheless, there is an issue of emphasis: Modifying the current offense prong's language would emphasize to sentencing courts that their
focus should be on public protection-not just on violence.
A more acute problem is the current offense prong's potential for
overinclusion.
D. The Overinclusive Problems of a Violence Standard
Assuming future dangerousness from the presence of violence in an
offense also creates the opposite problem, that of overinclusiveness. Defendants whose offenses involved violence may not present a future danger to society. The incapacitation rationale for denying such defendants
a downward departure is thus unpersuasive. Because section 5K2.13 addresses offenses that involve "actual violence" or "a serious threat of violence," 96 it is worth separately considering defendants who might fall into
each of these categories. First, there are individuals suffering from diminished capacity who have committed violent acts but who do not pose
a threat to society, or who would not pose a threat to society with the aid
of proper psychiatric treatment.9 7 Second, there are individuals who
93. A sentence reduction in such a case would be reviewed by the circuit court for
abuse of discretion. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96-100 (1996) (setting out
abuse of discretion standard of review).
94. See Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927, 934 (7th Cir. 1932) (affirming district
court conviction).
95. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (2001) (providing that "[a] sentence
below the applicable guideline range may be warranted") (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Dyer, 216 F.3d 568, 569 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Even if the judge finds that the
defendant committed the offense while afflicted by a significantly reduced mental capacity,
he is not required to reduce the defendant's sentence; he is merely authorized to do so
. . . .11).

96. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(2).
97. These individuals may not qualify for downward departure under aberrant
behavior, id. § 5K2.20, because of the nature of their crime or criminal history.
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have threatened violence but who did not intend to carry it out or were
unable to carry it out.
1. Defendants Who Commit Violent Acts. - Although it has become
routine for courts to infer from a defendant's violent acts that he or she is
a danger to society, this assumption is unwarranted. As one circuit court
has noted, "Psychiatric treatment, for instance, may reduce the risk that
the offender will continue to commit crimes that put the safety of others
in jeopardy. '98 In United States v. Blake, the district court considered this
possibility and assumed the authority to depart downward under section
5K2.13 in a sentence for a violent crime. 9 9 The defendant pled guilty to
bank robbery and to assault during the commission of the robbery, in
which she stabbed a bank employee in the hand, causing permanent
damage. 10 0 The defendant, Summer Blake, was a young woman in her
early twenties with a three year old daughter. Blake had lived a difficult
life, with parents who had a history of drug abuse and with romantic partners who had abused her. Psychiatric problems had led to two suicide
attempts. However, during the extended period of time between her release on bail after being arrested for the robbery and assault, and her
sentencing for these offenses, Blake had made great progress in rehabilitating herself. She had received psychiatric counseling and spiritual guidance, had found work as a full-time receptionist, and had completed her
first semester at Pace University. 10 1
In analyzing its authority to depart, the court acknowledged that the
violent nature of Blake's crime might have made her ineligible for downward departure if she had been a risk to the public. 10 2 It concluded,
however, that "[b]ased on the facts and circumstances surrounding the
crime and Blake's post-arrest behavior, Blake's incapacitation is not necessary to protect the public. ' 10 3 Accordingly, the. court determined that
the current offense prong did not preclude departure in Blake's case. 10 4
For the defendant, the consequences of this determination were drastic:
it helped to make possible the court's reduction of her sentence from an
otherwise mandatory range of 87-108 months to "time served plus five
years of strictly supervised release. ' 10 5 The court explained that "[t] here
is little doubt that if Blake continues along this path [of rehabilitation],
she can and will be a peaceful and productive member of society."' 10 6
98. United States v. Atkins, 116 F.3d 1566, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
99. 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338-40 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
100. Id. at 331-32.
101. For details about Blake's background and rehabilitation, see id. at 332-37.
102. Id. at 338.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 339 ("A departure pursuant to section 5K2.13 is authorized.").
105. See id. at 332, 353 (providing initial Guidelines calculation and then providing
sentence the court in fact imposed as a result of its conclusion that downward departure
was authorized and warranted in Blake's case).
106. Id. at 340.
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The facts of Blake illustrate why denying district courts the discretion
to depart downward under section 5K2.13 for violent offenses may lead to
the overinclusion of certain defendants who, under the facts of their
cases, do not represent a danger to the public. Medical and psychological treatment may negate the very reason-incapacitation-for which departure was denied. 10 7 Denial of downward departure in such cases
would thereby unjustifiably conflict with section 5K2.13's policy of lenity
toward mentally ill defendants.' 0 8 Moreover, overinclusion of these defendants may well prove detrimental to society at large if it thwarts their
rehabilitation.' 0 9 As the court noted in Blake, "There is no doubt that
returning Blake to prison would reverse the progress that she has
made."1 1 0
2. Defendants Who Make Empty Threats. - The second category demonstrating the potential for overinclusion under the current offense
prong consists of a subset of defendants who only threaten violence. The
underlying reason for denying the possibility of downward departure to
individuals who threaten violence is that they may be just as dangerous as
those who succeed in perpetrating violence."' There are, however, mentally ill individuals who make threats of violence that they either do not
intend to or are unable to carry out. Thus, although these individuals.
ostensibly do threaten violence, their threats are not real. 1 2 Such defendants therefore do not pose the kind of danger to society that warrants their preclusion from downward departure." 3 Section 5K2.13 itself
appears to distinguish between different types of threats by using the adjective "serious" to modify the word "threat."' 14 Still, this phrase is ambiguous and undefined in the Guidelines: 1 5 Should "serious threat" be
107. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing incapacitation).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
("[T]he point of section 5K2.13 is to treat with lenity those individuals whose 'reduced
mental capacity' contributed to commission of a crime.").
109. For a discussion of the role of rehabilitation under the Guidelines, see infra Part
III.B.
110. 89 F. Supp. 2d at 346.
111. See, e.g., Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1454 ("[I]n determining whether a particular
crime qualifies as a 'non-violent offense,' the District Court need not limit itself to
determining whether the offense 'entail[ed] violence."' (second alteration in original)).
112. SeeJeremy D. Feinstein, Note, Are Threats Always "Violent" Crimes?, 94 Mich. L.
Rev. 1067, 1097 (1996) (arguing that "threats should only be considered 'violent' when
they create risk and that the creation of risk should be determined by examining whether
the threatener had the intent and ability to carry out his threat").
113. See United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that "the Commission has not required judges to treat the
innocuous threatener and the murderous one identically" while construing old version of
section 5K2.13).
114. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(2) (2001).
115. But see U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, The Year In Review: 1997-1998, 5 (1998)
(reporting that "[a]mong the criteria specified in the amendment [to section 5K2.13] is a
consideration of whether the offense involves actual violence or a substantial risk of
violence"), at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/97YRREV.PDF (on file with the Columbia Law
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judged by the defendant's subjective intent, by the perception of those
threatened, by a reasonable person standard, or by a predetermined categorical approach?
Consider a person engaging in an unarmed bank robbery. Dissenting in a case that drew a comprehensive evaluation of the old section
5K2.13 by members of the Third Circuit sitting en banc, Chief Judge
Becker provided a poignant illustration. 116 He described how the mayor
of a certain Pennsylvania town walked into a bank one day, saying to the
teller, "This is a robbery. I have a bomb on me."1 17 Taking $1,500 without injuring anyone in the bank, the mayor, who never actually had a
bomb in his possession, surrendered to the authorities shortly thereafter.
According to those who knew him, the mayor's conduct was the result of
"chronic depression related to personal and financial troubles." 11 8 The
Chief Judge concluded that it would "make[ ] no sense" to preclude
downward departure where a court "found beyond cavil that the defendant's actions were prompted by a deep psychological disturbance and
that there was no real threat of violence." 1 19 Three circuit courts seem to
120
agree with this principle.
On the other hand, it could be argued that the adjective "serious"
should not be judged according to the offender's intentions and capabilities because regardless of his intent and capacity to commit harm, his
threat might cause fright and elicit a response that risks danger to bystanders. At least one circuit court has taken a categorical approach to
1 21
characterizing certain kinds of threats as "serious."
Review). The term "substantial risk," though perhaps broader than section 5K2.13's own
"serious threat" language, is arguably no more elucidating and, in any event, is not to be
found in the text of the amendment to section 5K2.13. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual app. C, amend. 583.
116. The anecdote is drawn from United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 564 (3d Cir.
1998) (en banc) (Becker, C.J., dissenting), vacated by 159 F.3d 774 (3d Cir. 1998) (en
banc).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See United States v. Walter, 256 F.3d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no
"serious threat of violence" where defendant "did not possess any real intent to cause
physical harm"); United States v. Sharp, No. 99-4736, 2000 WL 962484, at *4 (4th Cir. July
12, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (suggesting that a threat that is "frivolous or
factually impossible" may not constitute "serious threat of violence" under section 5K2.13);
United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (construing prior version
of section 5K2.13 and arguing that "an offense that involved a real and serious threat of
violence-such as assault with a deadly weapon-" may "indicate that a defendant is
exceedingly dangerous, and should be incapacitated" (emphasis added)).
121. See United States v. Houser, No. 00-30235, 2001 WL 985713, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug.
24, 2001) (unpublished opinion). In Houser, the defendant was an unarmed bank robber
who "wrote a note promising not to use a gun if the bank teller cooperated." Id. The
circuit court categorically determined that "[t]he threat of gun use during a robbery ...
counts as a threat of death," and that a "defendant who threatens physical force cannot
avail himself of Section 5K2.13." Id. (citing United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91, 94 (9th
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An interpretation that would completely bar a downward departure
for defendants who make threats they have no intention or ability to carry
out is, however, problematic. 22 Such an interpretation is incompatible
with the policy goal of section 5K2.13, which is "lenity, not harshness,
toward those who are mentally or emotionally disabled." 12 3 Moreover,
two factors suggest that promoting the goal of lenity in such cases will not
put society at risk. First, section 5K2.13 is not available when a "criminal
history indicates a need to incarcerate the defendant to protect the public."1 24 As a result, even if a district court finds that a defendant made
only empty threats of violence, it cannot depart from the Guidelines if it
finds a sufficiently troubling criminal history. 125 Allowing the possibility
of downward departure, therefore, may amount to no more than giving a
mentally impaired first-time defendant a chance for a reduction in-not
an elimination of-his or her sentence. This is compassion the system
can afford.
Second, in some cases where a defendant lacks intent or capability, it
is further possible that targets of, or witnesses to, a threat do not actually
feel threatened. For example, public officials including the President
regularly receive threatening communications from mentally disturbed
people.1 26 To be sure, in these cases the threats "may be costly and dangerous to society in a variety of ways, even when their authors have no
intention whatever of carrying them out. ' 12 7 Yet the President may not
feel threatened at all. The perception of vulnerability by the President
Cir. 1990)). The court sought to distinguish Walter, 256 F.3d at 895, as an "unusual case"
in which an "indirect threat" to the President did not constitute a "serious threat of
violence." Houser, 2001 WL 985713, at *1. The court in Houser remarked that in Walter,
the facts indicated that the defendant did not intend to threaten the President, but only to
cause trouble for the person whose signature he had forged in the letter to the President,
whereas in Houser, the fact that the defendant was unarmed did "not diminish the
seriousness of that threat." Id.; see also Walter, 256 F.3d at 893 (providing details referred
to in Houser).
122. See Feinstein, supra note 112, at 1097 ("[P]eople who make threats that create
risk and fear should be sentenced more harshly than those whose threats create only
fear.").
123. United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993).
124. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(3) (2001); see text accompanying
note 2 (displaying full text).
125. Clause (3) of section 5K2.13 does not specify that the criminal history must be
"violent" or otherwise. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(3). For a pair of
district court sentencing orders that recently held that, although the current offense prong
would not preclude downward departures in cases where mentally impaired unarmed bank
robbers made only empty threats, departures in any event were precluded by the
defendants' criminal histories, see United States v. McFadzean, No. 98 CR 754, 1999 WL
1144909, at *5-*6 (N.D. IlI. Dec. 8, 1999); United States v. Bradshaw, No. 96 CR 485-1,
1999 WL 1129601, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 1999).
126. See, e.g., Walter, 256 F.3d at 893 (threatening the President); United States v.
Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 589-90 (7th Cir. 1991) (threatening the President).
127. Poff, 926 F.2d at 590 (quoting Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).
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likely is not heightened, for instance, by the receipt of an occasional letter from a mentally disturbed individual with a "20-year history of empty
threats" of this kind. 128 By one calculation, "[I] t is a tenacious myth that
those who threaten public figures are the ones most likely to harm
them [,] .... as demonstrated by the fact that not one successful public-figure
129
attacker in the history of the media age directly threatened his victim first."
Accordingly, the argument that certain threats might provoke a dangerous response that risks the well-being of others is difficult to support in
every case. Moreover, defendants who make threats of violence may likewise be cured of their impairments with therapy or medication, so that
the same arguments made in Part II.D.1 apply here as well. Since, in the
end, no one is physically harmed by the conduct of such defendants, an a
priori interpretation of the phrase "a serious threat of violence" without a
comprehensive evaluation of the facts and circumstances of a particular
130
threat would be overinclusive.
III. A BETTER APPROACH TO DOWNwADi

DEPARTURES FOR

DIMINISHED CAPACITY

The foregoing theoretical and practical problems with the present
version of section 5K2.13 lead to the conclusion that courts should read
the current offense prong to permit downward departures, even in cases
involving violence, when an individual poses insufficient risk to the public. To reinforce this shift in focus, the Commission should amend section 5K2.13 by striking from the current offense prong the words "because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence."
A. Emphasis on Public Protection by the Courts and the Commission
Courts should interpret section 5K2.13, as Blake did, to emphasize
the question of the risk imposed on the public by a mentally ill defendant, taking into account his or her potential for treatment. This reading
can be justified by the plain meaning of section 5K2.13's text: Although
violence or a threat of violence was present, the facts surrounding a given
offense simply might not "indicate a need to protect the public Uust]
128. See id. at 593, 595 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting) (describing defendant as "a pest,
a gnat buzzing in the ear of the Secret Service" and determining that "[i]ronically, we may
be sure that [defendant] is harmless because of her 20-year history of empty threats"). The
court nevertheless affirmed defendant's fifty-one month prison sentence. Id. at 593.
129. Gavin De Becker, The Gift of Fear: Survival Signals That Protect Us from
Violence 117 (1997).
130. See United States v. Askari, 140 F.3d 536, 561 (3d Cir. 1998) (Becker, C.J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that, under old version of section 5K2.13, a mentally impaired
defendant should not be precluded from downward departure when "(a) there was no
actual violence; (b) there was no real chance of violence being carried out; and (c) no one
in the bank at the time of the robbery actually felt threatened by the defendant"), vacated
by 159 F.3d 774 (3d Cir. 1998).
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because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of
13 1
violence."
As described above, this reading of section 5K2.13 is also consistent
with the actions taken by the Commission in amending that section in
1998.132 The fact that the Commission selected language that made protection of the public the initial inquiry and shifted away from the original
threshold requirement of a "non-violent offense" implies that courts
should not ignore the former in favor of the latter. 133 "Although the
Commission falls far short of offering the courts a bright line rule here,
th[e] commentary [accompanying the amendment to section 5K2.13]
suggests that it intended the new language to have some effect."'13 4 The
problem with an approach that focuses on violence is that it gives this
new language no effect. Since the Commission explicitly characterized
the new provision as "a compromise approach"1 35 to a conflict that had
divided two minority courts (which took a case-by-case approach to section 5K2.13 eligibility) from six majority courts (which assessed section
5K2.13 eligibility according to a fixed violence standard),1 3 6 this must indicate a shift in sentencing policy away from exclusive reliance on
violence.
The main drawback of depending on a judicial solution to the
problems arising under the current section 5K2.13 is that the case law
strongly suggests that courts are wedded to a construction of the section
that makes past violence a proxy for future dangerousness, without concern for a defendant's potential for treatment.13 7 Thus, action by the
131. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13(2) (2001); see supra text
accompanying note 2 (displaying full text).
132. See supra Part II.A.
133. See Ellis, supra note 78, at 322 (drawing a similar conclusion about the import of
section 5I2.13's amended language).
134. United States v. McFadzean, No. 98 CR 754, 1999 WL 1144909, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 8, 1999) (citing U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 583).
135. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 583.
136. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text (describing circuit split).
Although the commentary to the 1998 amendment depicts a circuit conflict dividing three
circuits from five circuits, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 583, that
ratio reflects the eleventh-hour shift in the position of the Third Circuit, which abandoned
the majority view one day after the Commission proposed the amendment to section
5K2.13, see United States v. Askari, 151 F.3d 131, 131 (3d Cir. 1998) (describing timing of
Third Circuit's shift and Commission's proposal).
Accordingly, although the
amendment's commentary depicts a five to three split, it was in actuality a six to two split
that had precipitated the proposed (and later adopted) amendment. See supra notes 44,
46 and accompanying text (describing Third Circuit's shifting positions on section
5K2.13).
137. See supra Part II.B (discussing court application of new section 5K2.13). A
recent decision by the Seventh Circuit indicates an unwillingness to adopt the holistic
approach to the current offense prong taken in United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328
(E.D.N.Y. 2000). See United States v. Cravens, 275 F.3d 637, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2001)
(determining that current offense prong, "by its plain language, [neither] refers to nor
depends upon the defendant's mental health condition").
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Commission may be necessary to ensure that the prime focus is on
whether "the facts and circumstances of the defendant's offense indicate
a need to protect the public." Accordingly, the Commission once again
should amend section 5K2.13, to strike the words "because the offense
13 8
involved actual violence or a serious threat of violence."
Changing the Guidelines to ensure that a defendant's risk to the
public is more determinative of his or her ability to receive a reduced
sentence would be consistent with a district court's role regarding sentence departures. The Supreme Court has noted that in assessing the
facts that bear on a decision to depart from the Guidelines, the district
courts have an "institutional advantage." 139 Although this "advantage" is
that of the district courts over the appellate courts, the district courts,
with their "vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing, 1 40 can also better predict a defendant's future danger to society
than can the Commission. Moreover, in the legislation that gave birth to
the Guidelines, Congress itself explicitly requires courts to consider "the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteris14 1
tics of the defendant" in imposing a sentence.
Some might argue that unequivocally granting greater latitude to the
district courts to decide who is a public safety risk would undermine the
overall policy goals of the Guidelines, which include curtailing the almost
limitless discretion sentencing courts enjoyed prior to the Act. 142 This
argument fails to consider that under the Guidelines, the district courts
are already entrusted with determining when a factor that is explicitly
discouraged should nonetheless serve as a basis for departure in a given
case because "such characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual
degree and distinguishes the case from the 'heartland' cases covered by
the [Gluidelines."1 43 A fortiori, since diminished capacity is an encouraged basis for downward departure in sentencing, permitting the district courts to assess more freely the import of a defendant's current offense (in the same way they assess the import of a defendant's criminal
138. A version similar to that proposed by this Note, "Option Four," discussed supra
note 71, was advocated by the Federal Public and Community Defenders at the time the
Commission was selecting the language for the 1998 amendment. Statement of Kathleen
M. Williams, Fed. Pub. Defender, S. Dist. of Fla., on behalf of Fed. Pub. and Cmty.
Defenders, concerning the Proposed Guideline Amendments, before the U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, Washington, D.C. 40 (Mar. 12, 1998) ("Not every defendant convicted of a
violent offense . . .will present such a threat [to the safety of others]."), at http://www.
ussc.gov/agendas/3_12_98/williams.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
139. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).
140. Id.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1994).
142. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 (1989) (noting that prior to the
Guidelines, "great variation among sentences" posed serious problems for the
"evenhanded and effective operation of the criminal justice system").
143. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0 (2001); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 98
(discussing departures based on discouraged factors).
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history) 144 would hardly amount to a renewed opportunity for unbridled
discretion. 145 Such explicit authority would complement the license district courts already have to rely on their own evaluation of a defendant's
mental state in lieu of the opinion of a defendant's own expert 46 and to
47
decide the extent of any departure granted.'
Moreover, there is little basis for another possible concern-that a
case-by-case inquiry into who should be disqualified from section 5K2.13
on the grounds of risk to the public would open the floodgates of downward departures. 14 All departures are still subject to the requirement
that "certain aspects of the case must be found unusual enough for it to
fall outside the heartland of cases in the Guideline.' 149 Sentencing without an explicit violence inquiry remains very much a task of relative evaluations, a "matter[ ] determined in large part by comparison with the facts
of other Guidelines cases."' 50 It is also important to recall that the departure component of sentencing under the Guidelines is entirely at the dis144. Even a traditionally majority circuit, the Ninth Circuit, has determined that an
"individualized determination" is called for with respect to the criminal history prong of
section 5K2.13. United States v. Davis, 264 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing United
States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also infra text accompanying note 168
(describing Cantu requirements for applying the criminal history prong of old section
5K2.13).
145. But see Feinstein, supra note 112, at 1095 (discussing "the problems with an
unstructured inquiry into dangerousness" by district courts). The Commission could
address these problems, however, by providing some guidance for a district court's inquiry
into a defendant's dangerousness. See infra text accompanying note 168 (outlining an
example of guidance that could be offered to district courts in their application of section
5K2.13).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Montague, No. 00-1215, 2000 WL 1617975, at *2 (2d
Cir. Oct. 27, 2000) (unpublished table decision) ("[T]he court is not required to accept a
determination concerning a defendant's mental state offered by his own expert, and may
rely on the court's own assessment of the defendant." (citation omitted)); United States v.
Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that "[d]istrict courtwas not bound to
accept" the psychologist's report provided by defendant as its "conclusion," and that
"[t]he government offered a contrary analysis that the court found persuasive"); see also
United States v. White, 71 F.3d 920, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (disregarding court appointed
psychologist's conclusions).
147. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0 ("The decision as to whether
and to what extent departure is warranted rests with the sentencing court on a case-specific
basis.").
148. See, e.g., Pelayo, supra note 80, at 763-64 (noting that "fact-specific inquiry...
will not only open the door to reductions in sentences in numerous cases where mitigation
is unwarranted, but it is likely also to create an increased burden on the criminal justice
system").
149. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996); see also U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0, cmt. ("In the absence of a characteristic or circumstance that
distinguishes a case as sufficiently atypical to warrant a sentence different from that called
for under the guidelines, a sentence outside the guideline range is not authorized." (citing
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994))); Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1511 (maintaining that mental and
emotional conditions are relevant to sentencing decisions only in extraordinary cases).
150. Koon, 518 U.S. at 98.
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cretion of the district courts; 15 1 defendants have no right to a reduced
sentence on account of their diminished capacity. Given this reality, the
Commission should amend the Guidelines to make explicit that district
courts can be reasonably entrusted to consider all relevant facts in their
diminished capacity departure decisions.
B. Experience of Courts in Focusing on Public Safety
Courts have already demonstrated their competence at addressing
diminished capacity beyond considerations of violence. In Blake, for example, the court "intentionally delayed the sentencing of Blake for six
months in order to provide a practical test of rehabilitation," a practice it
deemed very useful since "Blake's past and probability of future rehabilitation play a critical role in the departure analysis. 1 52 The rehabilitative
efforts undertaken by the defendant after her arrest in fact were the basis
1 54
1 53
and its decision to do so
for both the court's authority to depart
under section 5K2.13. Thus, instead of restricting its sentencing analysis
to considerations of violence, the court found postponing the defento be most useful
dant's sentencing to allow for evidence of rehabilitation
155
in determining the need to protect the public.
One might object that this practice contravenes the congressional
mandate that the "Commission shall ensure that the guidelines reflect
the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment
for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant."1 5 6 However, while this
directive may be construed to prohibit imprisonment in order to facilitate
rehabilitation, rehabilitation can be a relevant factor for other aspects of
the sentencing process, such as choice of sentence.1 57 Furthermore, the
151. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
152. United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); see supra Part
II.D.1 (discussing Blake case). For a more detailed description of this technique, see Jack
B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass Society, 8J.L. & Pol'y 385, 409 (2000).
153. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39.
154. Id. at 353.
155. Id. at 340.
156. 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994).
157. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A(2) (2001) (noting that
rehabilitation is to be an objective of sentencing under the Guidelines). As the Senate
Judiciary Committee Report states,
[T]he Committee has retained rehabilitation and corrections as an appropriate
purpose of a sentence, while recognizing, in light of current knowledge, that
"imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and
rehabilitation."
•.. [T] he purpose of rehabilitation is still important in determining whether
a sanction other than a term of imprisonment is appropriate in a particular case.
S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 76-77 (1983) (footnotes omitted); see also Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d at
345 ("Rehabilitation remains a fundamental consideration at sentencing."); cf. Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989) (noting that the Act "rejects imprisonment as a
means of promoting rehabilitation").
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Act specifically states that a "court, in determining the particular sentence
to be imposed, shall consider ...the need for the sentence imposed...

to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner."15 8 If a court must take these factors into account in determining a
sentence, it seems reasonable that a court may delay a defendant's sentencing in order to permit the defendant to demonstrate rehabilitation
and pursuit of these goals. In fact, presentencing rehabilitation has been
permitted as a departure factor by every circuit court that has decided the
issue since Koon v. United States. 159 Presentencing rehabilitation, unlike
postsentencing rehabilitation,1 60 has also been accepted by the Guidelines as a basis for sentence departures. 161 Thus, courts may have some
opportunity to evaluate defendants beyond the conduct generating their
convictions, and courts should therefore not be limited to considering
only the defendants' past acts of violence.
Furthermore, when courts are not confined to concerns about violence, important issues may emerge in clearer perspective. This conclusion is supported by two circuit court opinions under the old version of
section 52.13.162 In these cases, one in a majority court, 163 one in a

minority court, 164 the defendants, Vietnam veterans suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder, had been convicted for being felons in possession of firearms.
From the start, it was somewhat fortuitous that violence did not preclude downward departure in either case: in the majority court because
the crime was not a "crime of violence" under section 4B1.2; t 65 in the
minority court because the government had dropped its argument that
the crime was not "non-violent" on appeal.1 6 6 These features of the cases
158. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2) (D) (1994). This instruction has been interpreted to
include rehabilitation as a purpose of sentencing. See Schulhofer, supra note 35, at 860
(citing the instruction as evidence that in "ruling out personal circumstances and
rehabilitative potential as factors in sentencing to prison, sections 994(e) and 994(k) [of 28
U.S.C.] are easily misinterpreted to mean that such factors are not relevant in decisions
about probation, in other words that they are not relevant at all").
159. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amend. 602 (citing United States v.
Brock, 108 F.3d 31 (4th Cir. 1997)); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
160. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.19.
161. Id. app. C, amend. 602 (noting that section 5K2.19 "does not restrict departures
based on extraordinary post-offense rehabilitative efforts prior to sentencing"). This
possible source of departure is itself neither fertile nor broad enough to cover the kinds of
changes in sentencing practice this Note seeks.
162. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (1995) (amended 1998); supra
note 4 (displaying full text).
163. United States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1993).
164. United States v. Atkins, 116 F.3d 1566, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
165. Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1513-14 ("'[C]rime of violence' does not include the offense
of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon." (quoting U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1 (formerly cmt. n.2) (2001))); see supra note 42 (describing
"crime of violence" under section 4B].2).
166. Atkins, 116 F.3d at 1569 n.4.
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might have been different. That is, the Commission conceivably could
have classified possession of firearms by felons as a crime of violence that
applies to career offenders under section 4B1.2. In the minority court, if
the government had challenged the nonviolence of the crime on appeal,
the circuit court might have focused exclusively on the violent features of
the defendant's crime, neglecting, as the Fourth Circuit did in United
States v. Bowe, 167 considerations of the risk the defendant posed to the
public and the effect psychiatric treatment might have on that risk.
Instead, the two courts developed criteria to determine when, under
the old version of section 5K2.13, a mentally impaired defendant's criminal history indicated a need to protect the public. The courts focused on
the relationship between a mentally impaired defendant's dangerousness
and his or her possible medical treatment:
The court's decision must be precise and fact-specific, and must
take into account any treatment the defendant is receiving or
will receive while under sentence, the likelihood that such treatment will prevent the defendant from committing further
crimes, the defendant's likely circumstances upon release from
custody or its alternatives, the defendant's overall record, and
the nature and circumstances of the offense that brings the defendant before the sentencing court. 168
As this Note has attempted to demonstrate, this line of inquiry prescribed
by the courts may well be more relevant in protecting society than the
characterization of a defendant's crime as violent. Thus, by thinking
outside the "violence" box, courts can promote protection of the public
while displaying compassion toward the mentally ill.
C. An Urgency Given the Federal CriminalJustice System's Current Approach
to Mental Health
Encouraging the district courts to focus more broadly on public
safety at the time of sentencing is also important given the way Congress
and the Commission deal with mental illness at present. 169 Section
5K2.13 does acknowledge at sentencing that a mentally impaired defendant is less culpable than the average defendant on account of his or her
167. 257 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of Bowe, see supra Part II.B.
168. Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1516; see also Atkins, 116 F.3d at 1570 (presenting its version of
Cantu test).
169. See generally Perlin & Gould, supra note 36 (discussing problems in the
treatment of mental disability under the Guidelines). In particular, they discuss the
relationship between the Guidelines and a prejudice they term "sanism" that affects the
legal system, making it "easy to understand how evidence of mental illness-ostensibly
introduced for mitigating purposes-can instead be construed by judges as an aggravating
factor." Id. at 442-44. But see United States v. Doering, 909 F.2d 392, 395 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that "the need for psychiatric treatment is not a circumstance which justifies
[upward] departure").
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psychological or physiological disease. 170 An emphasis on the violence of
an offense rather than on a defendant's potential for rehabilitative treatment, however, less adequately projects this notion to the administration
of the sentence. If, for example, while serving time, the defendant's
mental disease becomes treatable, then the purported basis for not departing downward under section 5K2.13-incapacitation to protect the
public 7 1-is no longer justifiable. The violence of the offense for which
the defendant was sentenced in such a case becomes irrelevant since it
should no longer serve as the most accurate predictor of the defendant's
danger to society. Alternatively, a focus on the defendant's risk to the
public, in light of his or her potential for treatment, at least offers a more
flexible standard by which the court can make its initial sentencing
judgment.
Such flexibility at sentencing is especially important because, as
things stand now, the federal criminal justice system does not allow for
modification of a sentence based on medical advances or treatments that
render mentally ill prisoners no longer dangerous to society. 172 In general, the Act provides extremely limited opportunities for changing terms
of imprisonment based on postsentencing events. 173 The Act abolished
the parole system, 174 under which a prison term could be shortened
when the Parole Commission decided "an offender was sufficiently rehabilitated to be released. 1' 7 5 Moreover, section 5K2.19 of the Guidelines,
adopted subsequently to section 5K2.13, explicitly provides that "[p]ost170. See, e.g., Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1513, 1516 (holding that "[r] educed mental capacity"
under section 5K2.13 "comprehends both organic dysfunction and behavioral disturbances
that impair the formation of reasoned judgments" and that, as a rationale for sentencing
the mentally impaired to incarceration, "[d]esert (blameworthiness) loses some bite
because those with reduced ability to reason, or to control their impulses, are less
deserving of punishment than those who act out of viciousness or greed"); see also United
States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 546, 549 n.16 (3d Cir. 1997) ("While the term 'mental
capacity' as used in section 5K2.13 is a legal, not a medical term, we believe that evaluation
of a defendant's mental capacity must necessarily be informed by an appreciation and
understanding of the defendant's medical condition.").
171. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing incapacitation).
172. This is so despite Congress's charge to the Commission to ensure that
"sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system ... reflect, to the
extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the
criminal justice process." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1) (C) (1994).
173. See infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text (describing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3582(c), 3621 (e) (2) (B), 3624(b) (1) (2000)); see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Fear of
Law: Thoughts on Fear ofJudging and the State of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 44
St. Louis U. LJ. 299, 318 n.89 (2000) ("A few vestiges of the former power of correctional
officials remain. The 'truth in sentencing' component of the Sentencing Reform Act
mandated that federal prisoners serve virtually all of their stated sentences.").
174. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A(2) (2001) ("The Act also
abolishes parole, and substantially reduces and restructures good behavior adjustments.");
Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 4 (1988) ("Congress responded by abolishing
parole.").
175. United States v. Blake, 89 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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sentencing rehabilitative efforts, even if exceptional, undertaken by a defendant after imposition of a term of imprisonment for the instant offense are not an appropriate basis for a downward departure when resentencing the defendant for that offense. ' 176 Opportunities for sentence
modification by courts are available only when "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction"; the defendant is at least seventy years old, has spent at least thirty years in prison, and is no longer a
danger to the community; there is other express statutory permission; or
the Commission has lowered the sentencing range under which the defendant was sentenced.1 77 In addition, Congress has authorized the
for
Bureau of Prisons to reduce sentences for "good time" served 1 78 and
79
the successful completion of substance abuse treatment programs.'
The weight of the restrictions on the reevaluation of imprisonment
terms falls especially harshly on the mentally ill. For example, section
5K2.19's prohibition against the consideration of postsentencing rehabilitation when resentencing a defendant may be applied to the mentally ill.
But equating the rehabilitation of a typical inmate with the advancements
made by a mentally ill inmate undergoing medical treatment would be
unwarranted. While rehabilitation does not absolve the typical inmate of
his or her crime, medical treatment may cure the mentally ill inmate of
the condition that rendered him or her dangerous to society. Thus, unlike ordinary rehabilitation, medical treatment of mentally impaired prisoners may wholly negate the basis for their incarceration-incapacitation.1 80 Furthermore, it is arguably unfair that an inmate who has
completed the Bureau of Prisons' substance abuse treatment program
18 1
may have his or her sentence reduced by a maximum of one year,
whereas a mentally impaired inmate receives no similar reduction in sentence for commencing a behavior-improving drug regimen.182 Inequities
176. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.19. The Guidelines based this
determination on the grounds of inequity to those who have no opportunity to be
resentenced de novo, and of inconsistency with Congress's policies under the Act,
including 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Id. app. C, amend. 602; see also infra note 178 and
accompanying text (describing briefly 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)).
177. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c); see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1BIO
(describing imprisonment term reductions as a result of amended Guideline range).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (providing possibility of credit toward service of
sentence if "the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional
disciplinary regulations"). Interestingly, this provision has been amended to include
application to those convicted of a crime of violence. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1)
(2000) (applying to "a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year
other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner's life"), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(b)(1) (1994) (amended 1996) (applying to a "prisoner (other than a prisoner
serving a sentence for a crime of violence) who is serving a term of imprisonment of more
than one year, other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner's life").
179. 18 U.S.C. § 3621 (e) (2) (B) (2000).
180. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing incapacitation).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) (2) (B).
182. Although a reduced period of imprisonment based on the successful completion
of a substance abuse treatment plan is only available to a prisoner convicted of "a
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such as these make it critical that district courts have more power to consider all the facts and circumstances of a defendant's offense at the time
of sentencing.
CONCLUSION

The Sentencing Reform Act established a mechanical federal sentencing system. While providing for some consideration of individual circumstances, the Guidelines ensure that downward departures in sentencing are available only under narrow and limited conditions. Special
attention must be paid to the way the Guidelines affect the mentally ill
since the justifications for their imprisonment differ from the justifications for imprisoning the typical defendant.
The Guidelines provide no compelling rationale for making nonviolence the conclusive factor in determining which defendants may benefit from a section 5K2.13 downward departure. Exclusive reliance on the
violence of a defendant's actions or threats to predict his or her future
danger to society is ill-conceived. Given that the courts are already entrusted to provide a downward departure for those with "significantly reduced mental capacity," they should also have the power to determine
which defendants pose a risk to society and which do not. Therefore, the
courts should take advantage of section 5K2.13's elastic formulation to
make departure potentially available to any defendant who does not constitute a danger to society. The Commission should codify that approach:
It should once again amend section 5K2.13, by striking the inquiry into
violence.
nonviolent offense," id., this Note has sought to demonstrate that the federal criminal
justice system should not necessarily attribute the same significance to the violence of an
offense committed by a mentally impaired offender as it does to the violence of an offense
committed by the average offender.

